interesting and skilful task, but one which is not very forgiving of mistakes. Accidents and incidents: Two problems are receiving attention at the moment. The first is that of wire strikes, hitting power cables when flying low level. The Army have 7 of these accidents per year on averagesome serious, some trivial, some in which the wire is seen but not avoided, some in which it is totally unseen. They are documented as pilot error or operational hazard.
If you calculate the distance at which a halfinch diameter cable can be seen and identified and then translate that into time available at certain speeds, the time is seen to vary from 15 seconds or more down to 5 seconds or less at high speed. The pilot may notice the wire or poles but if he is looking to one side or inside the cockpit the time margin can be seriously eroded; hence 'if low go slow' is the dictum. Wire detectors have been experimented with but they inevitably detect everything else at low level and at present do not provide a useful solution.
The other problem is quite simply the fact that approximately 80% of Army Air accidents are attributed to pilot error. This may reflect the cause coding and investigation classifications at present in use, or an exceptionally good servicing record, but it is nevertheless significantly higher than any other nation's Army aviation force.
Consequently a project has recently been introduced, the Human Factors Investigation of Army Aircraft accidents and incidents, with the aim of reducing the pilot error rate.
It is too early, and this is not the place, to report upon the findings, but it is mentioned to show that human factor aspects are receiving more attention, and that the result will be, it is hoped, the safer and more efficient operation of the aircraft.
Surgeon Lieutenant Commander A P Steele-Perkins (Royal Navy) Human Factor Problems of Operating Helicopters at Sea
This presentation highlights the types of Naval flying that differ from Army or RAF flying and therefore have different human factor problems. Two helicopters and the human factors associated with them are discussed.
The Wasp
General: The Wasp is a small single-engined helicopter carried in frigates of about 2500 tons. It is used as an attack aircraft carrying antisubmarine torpedoes, or air-to-surface missiles against fast patrol boats. The Wasp pilot is usually a Lieutenant of about 25. He is also the 'Flight Commander'. His duties involve him in broad areas of responsibilities, as he is in charge of several sailors and has to advise the Captain in aviation matters. As the normal operating area is the North Atlantic, and the ship is smaller than a cross-Channel ferry, ship movement is significant. The ship has stabilizers to lessen roll, but this causes an unnatural form of motion which is physically and mentally tiring.
Flying the Wasp: The Wasp is able to fly for only a short period, and therefore it is vital that it is launched at the right time. This is achieved by having various states of readiness depending on the severity of any impending attack. For example, if the threat is not immediate the pilot has several minutes in which to get airborne, and in this situation he remains changed and near the aircraft. At the highest alert state he is sitting strapped in the aircraft waiting to start up, and can remain like that for some time. Much of the flying is done solo. Being airborne with limited endurance, and relying on the ship's radar for the return to the shipas the aircraft has no navigational aidscreates a background worry. A high proportion of the flying is done at night. When it is really dark, with no moon or stars, there is no horizon to look at, and therefore no orientating references. Instruments have to be relied on. The Wasp is very limited in power, and !uses full power for take off. To lift off from the ship's deck, which is lit, check the instruments to see that nothing has gone wrong, turn into the darkness to avoid the hangar, and then concentrate on the instruments, is very hard workespecially as the entire sequence is over in five seconds. Most Wasp pilots say that it is very lonely on one's own. In part, this is fear of disorientation. The design of the instrument panel could be improved, and reaching for some switches necessitates looking away from the instruments. For safety reasons the aircraft is flown with the doors off, and rain, reflecting in the green navigation light, creates a feeling of movement which is most alarming.
The most stressful part of all is approaching the ship at night. The pilot is directed by the radar operator to a point on the ship's quarter, and is told to start descending. When he is close to the ship he is advised to 'look up for sight'. This sight is a glide path indicator; if he is flying down the approach at the correct angle it gives a green light, red if low, and amber if he is too high. In addition, there is a row of lights on the hangar which gives a horizontal attitude reference.
However, it is very easy, with these isolated visual references which alter with ship movement, to convince oneself that the correct approach is being flown when in fact it is not. There have been instances of pilots flying into the sea doing precisely that. In short, the work load on a Wasp pilot is extremely high, and it is easy for him to become over-saturated, especially when already fatigued.
The Sea King 1 General: The Sea King is a large twin-engined helicopter which carries a crew of four. It has its own radar, sonar, and a very sophisticated auto-pilot which enables it to hover completely automatically. It is mainly used as an antisubmarine helicopter and for long range search and rescue, having an endurance of up to five hours. Ships that operate Sea Kings are converted cruisers or aircraft carriers. These ships have additional high noise factorssuch as Phatitom jet fighters which require engine test runsthat affect sleep.
Operationally the Sea King is very effective, more so than a frigate in antisubmarine warfare. Because of this it is used to the full. In an exercise a typical flying programme would be: fly for four hours, have a few hours' rest, and then fly for another four hours, and so on. But if the 'rest period' is examined, by the time the aircrew have debriefed, changed, eaten, changed again, briefed, and climbed into the aeroplane, the period of actual rest is quite short.
Flying the Sea King: The Sea King was not tailor madeit was an American design modified by Westlands. Although this is the first helicopter that has been capable of flying for long sortie times, human factors in helicopters have tended to be neglected. The result is fatigue.
The main factors contributing to fatigue are as follows:
(1) Discomfort: Operating in an unhospitable environment necessitates the wearing of special clothing and carrying survival aidswhich is uncomfortable. The seats give no effective back support, as everyone has to lean forward for various reasons: the pilot to see the instruments, the sonar operator to see his displays, and most of all the observer, whose radar screen is designed so that he has to lean forward in order to interpret it. Very few observers have trouble-free backs. Thermal discomfort in the Sea King is a subject in itself, but will not be discussed here.
(2) Vibration: Any helicopter vibrates, but a squadron Sea King with rotor blades worn by the salt atmosphere vibrates excessivelyso much so that on approaching the hover at night, the instrumentswhich are badly designed and litvibrate so much that they become illegible. One particular feature is a vibration frequency that causes the hairs in the nose to vibrate and itch. One is compelled to scratch it, with an oily flying glovewhich causes further irritation! (3) Noise: The interpretation of the sonar is by visual and auditory means. Visually, the sonar beam shows as a path of light with the submarine showing as a distinct blip, and as an auditory echo which is different to the background sea noise. But the operator and the observer sit right underneath the noise hub of the helicopterthe gearbox. Because of the high noise level, which is transmitted through the internal communication system, and the background radio and intercom noise level, the efficiency of both the sonar and the operator diminish. Controlled trials refute this, but they produce only half of the fatiguing factors. The pilots spend a large part of the sortie just physically monitoring the controls, as the aircraft is able to hover completely by itself. After a time it is very easy to just gaze at the instruments and not interpret them, especially as it is boring in general for the pilots, and. boredom feeds fatigue.
In conclusion, a combination of discomfort, noise and vibration diminish aircrew and therefore operational performance, and in an exercise it is aircrew and not aircraft unserviceability that can be the limiting factor.
What of the future? Too slowly improvements are being made to increa,se comfort. In helicopters, the Wasp will be replaced by the Lynx, a twinengined high performance aircraft. The Sea King will also eventually be replaced. But obviously more attention will have to be paid to human factors to minimize the adverse effects of fatigue and disorientation in the naval environment.
